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For example, the US maintains 
that it has no legal obligation to 
intercepted refugees, even if they 
manage to reach its territorial sea. 
Indeed, the US recently argued that a 
Cuban asylum seeker – traditionally 
a highly favoured group under its 
domestic law – could not assert 
a right to protection because the 
bridge where her tiny boat landed 
had been disconnected by storms 
from the American mainland.
When some 10,000 persons 
managed to reach the Italian 
island of Lampedusa this year, 
Italy responded by discontinuing 
its traditional practice of sending 
them to Sicily for processing of 
protection claims. Instead, the BBC 
reports that the “migrants were 
despatched back handcuffed in 
military planes from Lampedusa 
direct to Libya. No questions asked.”
Spain erected dual razor-wire 
fences around its North African 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla to 
deter groups of largely sub-Saharan 
migrants anxious to enter the 
European Union. Even those who 
successfully scaled the barriers 
were often summarily sent back to 
Morocco, which is reported simply 
to have dumped them in desert 
border zones. The ‘success’ of this 
deterrent programme put renewed 
pressure on the Spanish Canary 
Islands, a favoured destination until 
2002 when radar and sea patrols 
were instituted to deter travel from 
Morocco to the Canarian islands of 
Fuerteventura and Lanzarote, some 
100 kilometres away. The most recent 
flows have thus been forced to take 
a much longer and more perilous 
route from northern Mauritania to 
Tenerife. The Spanish government 
has responded to the upsurge in 
arrivals by offering Mauritania patrol 
boats to stop departures and to set 
up refugee camps in Mauritania.
Are such practices legal? 
The 1951 Refugee Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol do not allow states 
to refuse protection to refugees just 
because they have not yet entered 
the core of its territory. Simply put, 
the most basic duties – including 
the critical duty of non-refoulement, 
requiring states not directly or 
indirectly to return refugees to the 
risk of persecution – apply wherever 
a state exercises jurisdiction. Whether 
protection is sought on Lampedusa or 
in Rome, the refugee law implications 
are identical. It makes no difference 
whatever if asylum is claimed by a 
refugee clinging to the outermost 
razor-wire fence at Ceuta or at a 
police station in Madrid. Nor may 
there be any peremptory refoulement 
of refugees encountered by vessels 
patrolling a state’s territorial waters, 
or even of those intercepted on the 
high seas. Because jurisdiction is 
the lynchpin to responsibility, state 
parties to the Refugee Convention 
must provisionally honour the rights 
Governments take often shockingly blunt action to deter 
refugees and other migrants found on the high seas, in 
their island territories and in overseas enclaves.  There 
is a pervasive belief that when deterrence is conducted 
at arms-length from the homeland it is either legitimate 
or, at the very least, immune from legal accountability. 
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information programmes be used to 
discourage economic migrants from 
setting out on long and dangerous 
journeys? And how can the protection 
capacities of countries of first asylum 
be strengthened so that refugees and 
asylum seekers do not feel obliged 
to move from one country and 
continent to another in order to feel 
secure and to meet their basic needs? 
In the 1980s, many thousands 
of people from Vietnam and 
Cambodia set to sea in the hope of 
reaching South-East Asian countries 
such as Malaysia, Singapore, 
the Philippines and Thailand. 
To address that movement, the 
international community established 
a Comprehensive Plan of Action that 
was intended to ensure the welfare of 
all these ‘boat people’ and to provide 
protection and solutions for those 
who qualified for refugee status. 
While the circumstances of the current 
movement across the Mediterranean 
and Atlantic are somewhat different, 
a similar approach is now needed, 
involving a coherent and interlocking 
cluster of measures, agreed to 
by countries of origin, transit 
and destination and supported 
by international organisations 
such as UNHCR and IMO.   
Conclusion 
The pattern of migration that we 
are witnessing in the Mediterranean 
today is not, in essence, a refugee 
situation. But the movement of 
people with a need for asylum and 
international protection is a feature 
of it. It is not an unmanageable 
situation and there is scope for action. 
It is a problem for individual states 
though it has no specific geographical 
borders. A comprehensive and 
collaborative response offers 
the best chance of success.
Erika Feller is UNHCR’s Assistant 
High Commissioner (Protection). 
Email: FELLER@unhcr.org
1. www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_
id=257&doc_id=647
2. www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_
id=653&topic_id=257
3. www.imo.org 
of persons under their authority 
who claim refugee status until and 
unless they are fairly determined 
not to qualify for protection.
Despite the clarity of these legal rules, 
two kinds of argument are made 
in support of deterrent measures.
The first is that insistence on rigorous 
respect for the rules of refugee law 
amounts to allowing the proverbial 
tail to wag the dog. Because in any 
given flow towards the developed 
world today refugees are significantly 
outnumbered by economic migrants 
– whose entry can normally be 
lawfully resisted – it is argued that 
governments must be free to respond 
effectively to the dominant (non-
refugee) character of the arrivals. 
As a matter of law, though, non-
selective deterrent measures cannot 
be justified where genuine refugees 
are part of a mixed flow. There is 
no exception to the duty of non-
refoulement for situations in which the 
cost or inconvenience of processing 
claims is great, or where only one 
in ten entrants is actually a refugee. 
Nor can states lawfully avoid 
refugee protection obligations by 
deciding simply not to assess claims 
made to them. As UNHCR rightly 
insists, a refugee does not become 
a refugee because of recognition, 
but is recognised because s/he is 
a refugee. In practice, this means 
that a person who may be a refugee 
must be provisionally treated as 
such until and unless he or she is 
fairly determined not to qualify for 
refugee status. Measures which deter 
refugee claimants from arriving in 
an asylum state are therefore no 
less in breach of refugee law than is 
the removal of a recognised refugee 
already present in a state’s territory.
A second and more complex 
argument for deterrence is sometimes 
made on humanitarian grounds. 
Particularly where refugees and 
others arrive by sea, often in 
rickety or grossly overcrowded 
vessels, it has been said that 
departures must be stopped in 
order to avoid risk to life or limb. 
There is, however, a critical legal 
distinction between sensible efforts 
to provide information and to make 
it difficult for traffickers to exploit 
people on the one hand, and more 
aggressive efforts actually to stop 
departures on the other. Whatever the 
risks, every person has the legal right 
to make the decision about departure 
for him or herself. The relevant rule 
in such cases is not rooted in refugee 
law but in the requirement in the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights1 that all persons 
be allowed to leave any country, 
including their own. Allegedly 
humanitarian steps taken to shut 
down escape routes – such as the 
formal agreement between the US 
and Cuba in 1994 requiring Cuba 
to “... take effective measures in 
every way it possibly can to prevent 
unsafe departures using mainly 
persuasive methods” – are unlawful 
and paternalistic. It is the refugee’s 
right – not the prerogative of any state 
or humanitarian agency – to decide 
when the risks of staying put are 
greater than the risks of setting sail.
Until and unless the abuse that 
causes refugees to flee in the first 
place is ended, the only real answer 
is to provide safe alternatives to 
unsafe routes of escape. While blunt 
deterrence of refugee or mixed flows 
is unlawful, states are perfectly 
free to conceive creative protection 
alternatives. Most sensibly, the focus 
should be on the establishment of 
genuine protection options within 
regions of origin. Where intra-
regional alternatives are truly safe 
and accessible and deliver rights-
based protection, it is likely that 
most refugees will feel no need to 
undertake perilous voyages. Indeed, 
where protection options that meet 
international legal standards are 
declined for economic, social or other 
reasons not related to protection, 
refugees who travel farther afield may 
lawfully be returned to their own 
region. For this reason, a re-emphasis 
on making real protection available 
closer to home should be attractive 
to developed states: while less 
‘efficient’ than (unlawful) deterrence, 
it is, nonetheless, consistent with 
their more general migration control 
objectives. It is also of real value to 
states in regions of origin, which 
desperately need binding guarantees 
of substantial resources to cope 
with endemic refugee flows. Most 
critically, it would enhance the 
welfare of the overwhelming majority 
of refugees not able or willing to 
flee beyond their own region.
Discussions along these lines are, 
of course, already occurring. There 
is clear interest in exploring both 
the operational flexibility which 
refugee law affords, and the value 
of systems to share out both the 
responsibilities and burdens inherent 
in refugee protection. It is not at all 
clear, however, that present initiatives 
are based on finding practical ways 
by which to respond to involuntary 
migration from within a rights-
based framework. Potentially lost 
in the discussions as they have 
evolved to date is the imperative to 
reform the mechanisms of refugee 
law not simply to avert perceived 
hardships for states but also in 
ways that really improve the lot of 
refugees themselves. If the net result 
of reform is only to lighten the load 
of governments, or to renew the 
capacity of international agencies to 
meet the priorities of states, then an 
extraordinary opportunity to advance 
the human dignity of refugees 
themselves will have been lost.
The challenge, then, is twofold. Most 
obviously, we must flatly reject the 
legitimacy of generalised deterrence 
which can block refugee flight, 
including even deterrent measures 
prompted by genuine humanitarian 
concern. Second, we should embrace 
the opportunities which reform of the 
mechanisms of refugee law affords 
both to save lives now risked in the 
flight to asylum and to improve the 
quality of protection for all refugees 
in the world, wherever located. 
James Hathaway is James E and 
Sarah A Degan Professor of Law, 
and Director of the University of 
Michigan’s Program in Refugee and 
Asylum Law (www.law.umich.
edu/CentersAndPrograms/pral/
index.htm). His most recent book 
is The Rights of Refugees under 
International Law, Cambridge, 
20052. Email: jch@umich.edu 
1. www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html 
2. www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.
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It is the refugee’s right  
to decide when the  
risks of staying put  
are greater than the  
risks of setting sail
